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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE.
L The history of thb origih.t and discussion of the indispensable importance,
3f the independence of the-judiciary, in all free states.
II. Statement of the. difference between legislative reforms in England and in
the American States.
1I. Comments upon some recent decisions in the English courts.
1. Discussion of the conclusive effect of foreign judgments, both as to law and
the fact involved, and review of the principles, upon which such conclusiveness
is based, and of the cases to some extent.
2. Careful examination of the foundation of the wife's claim to a separate
settlement out of her own property, for her own maintenance and support, and
that of her children by the husband against whom the settlement is claimed,
and nt what time a trust or equity on behalf of the children attaches.

We do not here purpose to examine in detail all the late developments, or changes, in so extensive and ever-',arying a system
of jurisprudence, as that of the English nation. That would
.require, for its accomplishment, a volume, instead of a brief paper
- of a few pages.
The most we could hope to do, in the present
article, is to note some of the morb marked changes, in the legislation, or th e judicial decisions of that country within the last
few months.
I. We shall scarcely need *to advert to the sublime mystery,
and the incomtprehensible phenomena, which are constantly being
brought to light, in the advancing life-of the jurisprudence of a
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great empire like that of England, with its affiliated states of the
Anglo-Saxon race, speaking the same language, and acknowledging the same fundamental system of laws. It is one of those vast
mysteries of Omnipotence, which no mortal vision can disclose or
penetrate, in advance of the footprints of its own onward march;
which is one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible of all
the works of the Creator, because it has no prototype, and is
developed upon no known plan. The p-dny agencies of humanity,
in its short-sighted wisdom, whether as legislators or judges, in
carrying forward the successive steps by which the history of the
jurisprudence of a great nation is marked, may seem to the agents
themselves, to be self-determined and self-supported. But they are
in reality, as much, and as obviously, under the immediate control
and direction of superhuman, invisible, and incomprehensible
forces, as are the earthquake and the storm. The proper appreciation of this truth may serve to make us thoughtful, and
circumspect, in what we do; and, at the same time, considerate and reserved, in what we say, in regard to subjects of this
character.
We hope it will not be regarded as altogether out of place, in
an article of this character, to allude to what appears, in our own
country, to be a growing distrust of the judicial department of
the several state and national governments; as if there might be
more probable danger to be apprehended from the overshadowing
influence, and arbitrary decrees of the courts, than from the
agencies of either of the other departments of government. It
is perhaps not unnatural to find some intemperate criticisms of
those decisions of the courts, more nearly affecting exciting
political questions; and especially in these exciting times; and
more especially, when the courts or the judges so far forget their
proper functions, as to travel out of their legitimate sphere, to
discuss questions at large, in no way necessarily or appropriately
connected with the very points in judgment.
But this, it should be remembered, when it occurs, is the fault
of the men, who, for the time being, happen to sit in the place
of ju lgment, and is not a vice naturally inhering in the system
itself. It is but one of those uncomely excesses, in the administration of jdstice, which is liable to occur in all administrative
functions, and which should be regarded rather, as an unsightly
excrescence, than as any necessary result of judicial administration.
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But we trust our readers, especially those of them who are
devoted to the active study and enforcement of the laws, in the
courts of justice, will not require to be reminded by us, that there
is something due to the function of judicial administration, in a
free government, altogether above, and quite independent of the
respect, which we feel called to bestow, either upon the men who
for the time hold the office of judges, or upon the character of
the judgments pronounced by them. The one or the other of these may be entitled to no just respect, in themselves considered;
and still it may be but the work of an incendiary, or a madman, to
attempt to bring them into general disrepute among the masses of
the population, whose unquestioning regard for the formal judgments of the courts duly established, is our only guaranty against
utter anarchy and wild confusion. In a free government, and especially one resting entirely upon the popular will-where all men
are absolutely equaf in legal power-it cannot escape the notice
of the least observant, that much of that quiet confidence and security which we all so-much prize, depends upon the habit of unquestioning submission, which, by long use, acquires the force of
necessity, and which pervades all classes alike; and which is as
involuntary, almost, as respiration, or the circulation of the blood;
and scarcely less indispensable to the vital functions of the
state, than are those quiet processes to the life of the individual
man. For whatever we may think of the importance of an able
and incorruptible executive -or legislative department, in carrying
forward governmental administration; still, for the security of
public or private rights; and for the promotion of public liberty
and private happiness; it is undeniably true, that more depends
upon a pure and wise administration of the laws by the courts,
than upon every thing else. The incorruptible purity; and the
firm, resolute, and overawing power of judicial administration; is
the very wheel at the fountain, which regulates and controls;
and which can alone regulate and control all the other functions
of government; .and which affords the only abiding and reliable
guaranty against public oppression, and private wrong, in all free
governments.
That man, therefore, however pure his motives or honorable his
purposes, is doing the public but a poor service, who lends his
aid, in any manner, to lowering the dignity, or lessening the
independence of the judiciary in a state, and especially a free
state. That the full development and universal enjoyment bf
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English liberty by every citizen of the realm, from the highest
to the humblest, in fact dates from the Revolution of 1688, and
the establishment of William Prince of Orange upon the throne,
no careful student of history will question. But there are nevertheless multitudes, fully conusant of this fact, who have no just
appreciation of its cause, lying chiefly in the full recognition of
the absolute and uncontrollable independence of the English
Bench from that date. Before that period the English judges
held their commissions only during the pleasure of the crown,
and were confessedly dependent upon the government for their
pecuniary support, which alone rendered the tenure of their
office entirely precarious and dependant: Creasy on the English
Constitution 302. So that while Magna Charta, the Petition of
Right, and the Habeas Corpus still stood upon the statute book,
they were nevertheless but a dead letter, until the independence
of the judiciary, both in regard to the tenure of office, and the
permanent salary of the judges, was effectually guarantied by the
Act of Settlement, in 1688, which was in these -memorable words:
" After the said limitation shall take effect, as aforesaid, judges'
commissions shall be made quamdiu bene se gesserint, and their
salaries ascertained and established," which is the foundation of
all the independence the judiciary enjoys in this country, as well
as in the English nation, at the present day : See Creasy 328.1
We need scarcely say anything more to the considerate and
the prudent upon this important topic. No careful student of
English history, who reflects that it cost the English nation, from
the establishment of its feudal despotism by William the Conqueror, a struggle of more than half a thousand years, to secure
the full guaranty of their liberties, by the recognition of the
unqualified independence of the judiciary, by William Prince of
Orange; and surely no wise lawyer, or far-seeing statesman ;
would counsel the abandonment of the very cardinal principle
upon which the entire superstructure of English liberty and English jurisprudence now depends. The man who in a free state
rejoices at the declension of the independent power of the judiciary may, not inappropriately, be compared to the cockles in the
I The very first article in the Bill of Bighta of 1688, recognises the fact that
James 11. (and it is equally true of many of the preceding sovereigns) "did
endeavor to subvert and extirpate the laws and.liberties of this kingdom, by
assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending the law and

the execution of laws, without consent of Parliament."

Creasy 317.
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Greek fable; and justly be considered, as "singing while his
house is burning down." After this imperfect vindication of the
absolute and indispensable necessity of the entire independence
of the judiciary, in all free states, we shall be the better prepared to estimate the effect of judicial decisions upon the jurisprudence of a nation.
II. The two principal means of the development of jurisprudence in a free state, will always be the legislature and the
courts. Hence the sharp conflict in recent times all over the
civilized world, almost, between the advocates of legal reform, by
means of codification, on the one hand; and on the other, through
the instrumentality of the courts ; in other words, between legislative and judicial emendation, or adaptation of the law. The
former may certainly reckon among its advocates a long list
of distinguished names, in the recent and living history of the
English nation. For at different times, and in different forms,
codification has been able to count among its advocates, apologists, or defenders, the distinguished names of Sir SAMUEL
ROMILLY, Mr. AuSTIN, Lord BROUGHAM, Lord CAMPBELL, and
the present Lord Chancellor WESTBURY; while on the other hand
the English writers only name Lord LYNDHURST, Lord CRANWORTH, Lord KINGSDOWN, ind Lord St. LEONARDS, as among its
more prominent opposers. But it is obvious to one familiar with
the practical workings of English jurisprudence, in the last half cen.
tury, that the two systems have been there worked in careful combination with each other, the legislature reforming such defects and
imperfectians of the existing law, as were of too long standing,
or too deep seated for the cure'of judicial reform; aftd the courts
all the time carrying forward a great work of accommodation and

adaptation of the laws to new facts and circumstances. This
must be regarded as the practical system of the American States
also, with this essential difference in the two countrieS, that in
England their attempts at legal reform, by means of codification,
have not, as yet, extended beyond the reference of particular
subjects to a Commission, for the purpose of obtaining the report
of the frame of a general statute embracing all the law, whether
statute or judicial, affecting the special interests embraced in the
Commission. This has been done too, in England, generally, and
as far as we know, universally, by means of'a Commission selected
with special reference to knowledge and experience of the defects
and wants of the law upon the particular subjects in question.
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Such Commissions in England have always been composed of their
most learned and experienced lawyers and statesmen; men entirely
competent to fill any judicial or executive office in the realm.
The result of this course has been to combine all the reforms
demanded, without encumbering the new statute with needless refinements and particularities, leaving those to the discretion of the
courts, as the contingencies arise. On the other hand the course
pursued in the American States of referring the entire subject of
statute revision to one Commission, not always selected so much
for their known wisdom and experience, as for other and less
indispensable qualifications, has more commonly resulted in securing more minuteness of legislative provision, with less opportunity for flexibility and adaptation to the contingencies of practical life and business.
The result has thus been quite the opposite in the two countries. While in English jurisprudence new and independent
provisions and changes, sometimes of a very radical character,
have frequently been introduced within the last few years,
by means of legislation; any thing like thorough codification,
upon any subject, has scarcely been attempted; and- until the
projects of reform of the present Lord Chancellor were brought
forward, no serious attempts at general codification have been
much discussed, in quarters where they would be likely to become effective in practice. But, on the other hand, in many of
the American States, vast codes of laws, covering almost the entire
field of general jurisprudence, have been matured and adopted;
and these codes afterwards enacted almost entire, without much
revision or 6onsideration, in other states. So that while the
efforts at codification in kngland have left the main bulk of the
law of the state under the control and supervision of the courts,
scattered through numerous volumes, widely apart in point of date,
and its purport to be spelled out by the wisdom and the patience
of the courts; many. of the American States have, to a considerable extent in their own apprehension, reduced their entire jurisprudence to a written code.
The present Lord Chancellor WESTBURY (the late distinguished
advocate, Sir RICHARD BETHELL, of the Equity Bar, and sometime Attorney-General), is a bold reformer, and not altogether
exempt from being thought obnoxious to the charge of radicalism.
It must be confessed, by his admirers and advocates, that he
bears the pruning-knife of the law with no sparing hand; and it
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is a favorite expression with. his lordship, since he finds himself
securely seated upon the woolsack, that the law must be effectually "weeded" of all impurities and defects.
We have no time to discuss his lordship's projects in detail
here. We have before briefly alluded to the leading scheme of
reform introdnced hy.his lordship, at his first setting out upon
tbat career: 3 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 74. We believe his lordship hap not met with 'all the success, as yet, which his sanguine
temperament, and long pent-up desires, in that direction, prompted
him at first to indulge the hope of accomplishing. It is worthy
of remark too, that many of his lordship's reforms in the narrawer and more limited spheres of his work of improvement in
the law, such as a short statute of limitations in suits upon
tradesmen's bills, in the county courts, and the giving of limited
equity powers to those courts, have, quite unexpectedly to himself,
metp with serious, not to say acrimonious opposition .from the
other Law Lords in the House of Lords, and equally among the
profession. The rzult of all which seems likely to be, that his
lordship's fine-drawn, air-built castles of legal reform, may probably prove, in the end, as unsubstantial and as baseless as those
of some of his distinguished predecessors in the same office.'
III. We shall now allude very briefly to a few of the late
:English decisions which appear to be of general interest in this
country, and which either are not to be republished in this
country, or else have not been as yet republished here, and which
therefore either will not become, or are not at present, generally
accessible to our readers.
1. We allude in the first place to a decision of the late Judge
Ordinary of Probate and Matrimonial Causes, Sir CRESSWELL
CRESSWELL, made not long before his lamented and sudden
decease. We refer to the case of Crisin vs. Doglioni, 9 Jur.
I We have not alluded specifically to the Commission for preparing a Code for
India, consisting of solne of the most distinguished English judges and lawyers,
as that forms rather an eiceptional case. It is probably known to our readers,
tliat
iA the Anglo-Indian empire, each separate people, or population, is governed
by distinct laws of itsowa. The Mahommetan is not subject to the same law as
the Christian, or the native inhabitant to the same law as the European, dwelling
for the time in those provinces. The purpose of the present Commission is to
prepare an entire and complete Code of civil law for the regulation of private
rightb among the Christian or European population of that portion of the empire.
One instalment of the work is already published, and the remainder is in ai
advanced state.
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N. S. 653, where it was held, in accordance with the cleares.
principle, no doubt, that where one died, domiciled in Portugal
his natural son was entitled to the succession to all his personal
estate, whether he died testate or intestate, he having obtained' a
final decree of affiliation in the Supreme Court of Lisbon; and
that the proper tribunals of the place of domicil having decided
the question of the right of succession and inheritance, the courts
of all other countries were bound by thait decision.
There is nothing new here in regard to the rule of law governing the right of inheritance so far as personalty is concerned ; -it
is confessedly the law of the place of domicil, which must control
the right of succession to personalty, in whatever country it may
be found. But there has been a considerable controversy, extending over a long period, in regard to the precise effect of the
adjudication of a foreign court, in determining the law of the
place where rendered. It has been often said, that such foreign
judgment is only primd facie evidence, either of the law or the
facts, implied in such judgment. This has been claimed to be
the established rule in many of the Continental countries of
Europe. But the English law, certainly, has been long evidently
tending to a more reasonable conclusion; and the present decision
seems to recognise the rule, as clearly established, that such
foreign law is conclusively settled by the decision of the foreign
court. That being conceded, there is no reason why the judgments of the foreign tribunals should not be equally conclusively:
in regard to the facts upon which they are founded. Thus 1t'
must result, that all foreign judgments will be held conclusive,
the same as a domestic judgment (the jurisdiction both of the
parties and the subject-matter being clearly established), unless
impeached for fraud or mistake. The record of the foreign court
is not indeed conclusive, as a matter of evidence; that is a matter
resting in pats; and to be determined as matter of fact upon the
evidence ; but being satisfactorily proved, the contract resulting
from the adjudication of the foreign court, is equally conclusive
with that of any domestic court, both as to the law and the fact of
that case. And in' this respect, it will make no difference,
whether the .judgment in the foreign forum were rendered by the
court of last resort or not. It is equally conclusive upon the
parties, and equally a merger of the subject-matter in the one
case as in the other. It will not indeed be evidence of the law
of that country, in other causes, unless rendered by the court of
last resort, as it is not in the country where rendered.

9
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All lovers of good law and good reason, cannot but rejoice to
see this salutary rule adopted'by a judge of such learning and

ability as the late Sir CRESSWELL CRESSWELL.

His language

upon the occasion of giving judgment is worthy repetition and
remembrance : c I have come to the conclusion, that it does not
belong to this court to sit as a Court of Appeal, from the Portuguese courts." The case is indeed susceptible of being placed
upon the special ground.of being an adjudication affecting the
status of the party, in the place of his domicil, and, therefore, in
the nature of a judgment in rem, and so conclusive everywhere; but the court assumes no such ground; and it must be
regarded as a clear recognition of the rule of the conclusiveness
of foreign judgments, except where want of jurisdiction or fraud
is shown, as held in Bank of Australasia vs. Nica, 16 Q. B. 717.
This general question is more fully discussed in an editorial
chapter in the last edition of Story on Equity Jurisprudence,

§§ 1570-1584.
We may here refer briefly to the rule laid down by Lord
Ch. J., in Tarleton. *vs. Tarlelon, 4 M. & S. 20,
where the effect of a foreign judgment was brought in question,
and the counsel for the defendant argued, that the foreign judgment was but primd facie evidence of debt, and might be encountered on their part by contradictory evidence in pais. His
lordship said: - I thought that I did not sit, at Nisi Prius, to try
a writ of error in this case upon the proceedings abroad. The
defendant had notice of the proceedings and should have appeared
and made his defence." This is precisely the same in effect as
ELLENBOROUGH,

the declaration of Sir CRESSWELL CRESSWELL, already stated.
2. There is another question, recently determined by the English courts of equity, which has excited a good deal of criticism
there, and which may not improbably occur here; and which,
although determined there, apparently, upon grounds more technical than general, is nevertheless one of extensive general application. We refer to the nature of the wife's, right to a settlement
out of her own estate, to be held for her benefit and support, and
that of her children, independent of all interest or control of the
husband. The question arose in the case of Wallace vs. Auldjo,
9 Jur. N. S. 687, where it was determined by V. C. KINDERS EY,
that this claim of the wife impressed no trust upon the property,
whereby the children could insist upofi its enforcement, in their
behalf, after the decease of the mother, unless there had been

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

during the life of the mother some decree of the court recognising the right, or some recognition of it by way of contract, be,ween the husband and the wife. The learned judge here discusses
the question very much in detail, reviewing all the former decisions bearing upon it, and finally comes to the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that it cannot be determined upon any settled
principle, or general policy of the law, but must be referred exclusively to the practice of the courts of. equity upon the subject.
There is no doubt the whole doctrine of what is called the wife's
equity to a settlement, as the learned judge declares, "is an
innovation on the common law rights of the husband, which has
been introduced by a process of judicial legislation, carried through
many years; and that in its application it involves many curious
anomalies." This mode of comment, however, seems to us rather
an undignified slight, cast, or attempted to be cast, upon a long
and well-recognised doctrine of the law; upon so vital a point
towards the stability of social life and prosperity, as the separate
and independent existence and support of families, than which
nothing, probably, is more indispensable to the maintenance of
quiet and good order. This half sneer seems to have been made the
fulcrum upon which the opinion of the learned judge chiefly turns;
viz., that as the whole superstructure of the wife's right to a
settlement rested upon a succession of judicial constructions, it
was the duty of courts to adopt such strictness of limitation,
in their future application of the doctrine, as by all possible
means to* restrain it within the narrowest boundaries. This is
certainly not generally regarded as the most approved rule to
apply to questions of this character. The old maxim, boni
judicis est ampliare jurisditionem (or as VAUGHN, J., said, in
Collins vs. Aron, 4 Bing. N. 0. 233, 235), i. e., justitian, seems
to imply, that if there is anything good in the doctine of judicial
construction, it should receive such an application by the courts,
as to preserve and extend its benefits rather than, by narrow constructions and forced limitations, to destroy its useful operation.
The very point in discussion in the case of Wallace vs. Auldjo
was indeed a narrow one; whether, and at wht point, the children
could claim the benefits of the mother's equity to a settlement on
behalf of herself and them ; but even this narrow question involved an inquiry into the nature and character of the wife's
right. And it would seem to answer no good purpose to show,
that the right, whatever it was, came into operation in derogation
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of the common law rights of the husband, and was the creation,
and the creature of the courts of equity. That is true of all the
most salutary rules and doctrines of the existing common law,
both of England and America; and upon no subject more than
in regard to the rights of married women; and of families, which
is the sphere and the proper citadel of women. There is almost
no great interest of society, and of social progress and reform,
that does not owe much of its present strength and maturity to
the fostering care and protection of the courts of equity. And we
should very much regret to find any serious attempt, in any quarter,
to bring that wise guardianship and protection into disrepute.
The learned judge very frankly confesses, that the rule contended for by the plaintiffs, in favor of the equity of the children
to maintain a bill to secure to themselves the benefits of their
mother's equity, after her decease, she having elected to claim
the settlement, and filed a bill for that purpose during her lifetime,'had received the sanction of some eminent equity judges,
and among others of Sir JOHN LEACH in Steinmetz vs. Halthin,
1 Gl. & Ja. 64.
There seems no question, that where the suit of the wife has
progressed so far as to an interlocutory decree, and the question
of the amount of the settlement was pending before the master
or the court; if the wife decease, the children may, by a bill for
that purpose, claim the benefit of the equity of their mother.
This rule is recognised in all the more recent decisions upon the
question: De la Garde vs. Lempriere, 6 Beavan 344, 7 Jur. 590;
Lloyd vs. Mason, 5 Hare 149; Osborn vs. Morgan, 9 Id. 432.
The rule is thus laid down by Lord ELDON, Chancel'lo, in Murray
vs. Lord Blibank, 10 Vesey 92. " The principle must be that
the Wife obtained a judgment for the bhildren, liable to be waived
if she thought proper ; otherwise to be left standing for their
benefit at her death." And in Lloyd vs. Williams, 1 Mad. 450,
there was a contract between the wife and the assignees of the
husband, and Sir T. PLUMER, V. C., after a thorough sifting of
the authorities up to that time, and an examination of the registrar's book, came to the conclusion, that the rule laid down by
Lord ELDON was the true one, and that a contract may stand in
the place of a judgment; but where there is neither contract nor
judgment, there is no perfected trust which can enure for the
benefit of the children ; and this iule was reaffirmed by the ViceChancellor in Wallace vs. Auldjo, and has been generally acqui-

